



The Public University Secretary Problem




Heather Newman (Carnegie Mellon)



SOSA 2024

Joint work with: **Benjamin Moseley (Carnegie Mellon)** and **Kirk Pruhs (U. of Pittsburgh)**

"RAND" (Classic) Secretary Problem




"RAND" (Classic) Secretary Problem



$$x_1 = 4$$


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
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
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



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


$$x_3 = 2$$


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
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




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"RAND" (Classic) Secretary Problem



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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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


Public University Secretary Problem



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


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
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
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


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

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
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
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
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


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
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
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


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
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RAND (Maximization) Secretary Problems

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All based on maximization objectives


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
All require beyond-worst-case approach to learn scale of secretary quality

Sample-and-price for RAND



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
Sample-and-price for RAND



Random Order
Arrivals

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Sample-and-price for RAND



Random Order
Arrivals

Know n


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
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
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
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
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


Upshot: only need to select most valuable candidate **with some (constant) probability**



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
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Public University **Lower Bound**

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Public University **Lower Bound**

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


N

Instance II



N



N^2

$n = 2$
 $k = 1$

Public University Secretary Problem



Random Order

+

Knowing n
INSUFFICIENT


2

$x_4 = 5$

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Public University **Lower Bound**

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


N

Instance II



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
N^2

$n = 2$
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$$N \gg 1$$

unbounded competitiveness!

Public University Secretary Problem



Random Order

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INSUFFICIENT


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Instance I



1




N

Instance II



N



N^2


$n = 2$
 $k = 1$

$$N \gg 1$$

unbounded competitiveness!

Public University Lower Bound

Instance I




1



N

Instance II



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Instance I




1



N

Instance II



N



N^2

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Why is random order not sufficient?

Public University Lower Bound

Instance I




1



N

Instance II



N



N^2

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Instance II



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Public University Lower Bound

Instance I




1



N

Instance II



N



N^2

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Public University Lower Bound

Instance I




1



N

Instance II



N



N^2

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- **Public University** is a **minimization problem**
- Cannot simply reject secretaries
 - ▶ **Must** hire **at least k** secretaries
 - ▶ Could be **forced to incur enormous cost**
- **RAND / maximization**: ignore cases where low-value secretaries hired

How do we break through the strong lower bound?

How do we break through the strong lower bound?

Learning-augmented approach:

How do we break through the strong lower bound?

Learning-augmented approach:

Online algorithm given “budget” B **a priori**
 B upper bound on OPT (cost of k cheapest secretaries)

Results

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Best possible online algorithm for Public University Secretary
 $\Theta(\log k)$ -competitive against B
in both **adversarial and random** arrival orders

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Key Takeaway: randomization of negligible benefit!

Results

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
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“Cautious” Algorithm


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“Cautious” Algorithm

(Roughly) *hire candidate i iff they are in “best” solution up until now*


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
Lower Bound of $\Omega(B \cdot \log k)$:

- ✓ Even with **random** ordering
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Key step: (roughly) any competitive algorithm must hire each candidate hired by the cautious algorithm


Lower Bound: Adversarial Order

First i
candidates:
(adversarial)
arrival order




Lower Bound: Adversarial Order


First i
candidates:
sorted




Lower Bound: Adversarial Order




Lower Bound: Adversarial Order




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


Lower Bound: Adversarial Order



Acceptance Property: with probability 1, hire $s(i)$ candidates among first i candidates, for all i

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Lemma: Every randomized algorithm that is competitive in adversarial order model has the **acceptance property**.

Lower Bound: Adversarial Order

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Idea: high cost secretaries arrive first



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





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





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




Batch i :
 2^i candidates,
each w/ cost $\frac{\text{opt}}{2^i}$



Lower Bound: Adversarial Order

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


⋮
 $\log k$ batches

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
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

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accept 1




$\log k$ batches


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
Batch i :
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accept 1



accept 2




$\log k$ batches



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



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


$\log k$ batches

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
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


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So we accrue $\Omega(B \cdot \log k)$ total cost!



Lower Bound: Random Order

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Acceptance Property: with probability 1, hire $s(i)$ candidates among first i candidates, for all i

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Lemma: Every randomized algorithm that is competitive in **random** order model has the acceptance property.


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Idea: construct instance such that a random permutation “looks like” adversarial instance with constant probability


Lower Bound: Random Order



Idea: construct instance such that a random permutation “looks like” adversarial instance with constant probability

Lower Bound: Random Order


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Lower Bound: Random Order


Make many copies of each batch, with earlier batches duplicated more

Idea: construct instance such that a random permutation “looks like” adversarial instance with constant probability




Lower Bound: Random Order

Make many copies of each batch, with earlier batches duplicated more




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
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


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Make many copies of each batch, with earlier batches duplicated more




Idea: construct instance such that a random permutation “looks like” adversarial instance with constant probability




Lower Bound: Random Order

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


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


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


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


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


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
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Very similar to online Steiner tree




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
Upper Bound: Adversarial Order

First i
candidates:
(adversarial)
arrival order




Upper Bound: Adversarial Order


First i
candidates:
sorted




Upper Bound: Adversarial Order




Upper Bound: Adversarial Order




Upper Bound: Adversarial Order



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


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
Simplified Cautious Algorithm: Candidate i hired iff candidate i in best solution after i candidates.

Upper Bound: Adversarial Order



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
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Unbounded competitiveness!

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
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Unbounded competitiveness!

Why?
Treats candidates of similar cost differently.

Upper Bound: Adversarial Order

First i
candidates:
sorted




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


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


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


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


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


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
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Upper Bound: Adversarial Order



General Cautious Algorithm: Candidate i hired iff candidate i in “**best**” solution after i candidates.

Upper Bound: Adversarial Order



General Cautious Algorithm: Candidate i hired iff candidate i in “**best**” solution after i candidates.

$O(\log k)$ -competitive algorithm

Future Directions

- Most classic setting: n candidates, maximize expected aggregate value
 - Assume **n is known** AND **random order arrivals**
 - Optimal $1/e$ -competitive threshold algorithm for $k = 1$
 - $\left(1 - O\left(1/\sqrt{k}\right)\right)$ -competitive algorithm for general k
- Matroid secretary (above: k -uniform matroid)
- Knapsack secretary problems
- Prophet inequality problems
- Secretary with advice
 - Prediction on secretary quality
 - Alternatives to random order: e.g., sample of secretaries

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Minimization variants

Other learning-augmented approaches

Thank You